Same Information, Different Decisions

Rational decision theory assumes that how a choice is presented should not affect the decision made — what matters is the substance of the options, not their packaging. Framing effects demonstrate that this assumption is wrong. The way information is presented systematically changes the choices people make, even when the underlying facts are identical.
The definitive experimental demonstration came from Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in a 1981 paper in Science, widely known for the "Asian disease problem." Participants were asked to choose between two programmes to address a disease expected to kill 600 people:
Gain frame: Programme A saves 200 people. Programme B has a one-third probability of saving 600 people and a two-thirds probability of saving nobody.
Loss frame: Programme A results in 400 deaths. Programme B has a one-third probability of nobody dying and a two-thirds probability of 600 deaths.
Mathematically, the two versions are identical: saving 200 from 600 is the same as 400 dying from 600. But in the gain frame, 72% chose Programme A (the certain option). In the loss frame, 78% chose Programme B (the risky option). The framing alone reversed the majority preference.