The Gold Standard as a War Constraint

The classical gold standard (approximately 1870–1914) imposed genuine discipline on governments. A country that printed more money than its gold reserves could support faced a run on its gold: citizens and foreign holders would present notes and demand gold, draining reserves. Governments that ran large deficits would see gold outflows that forced either spending cuts or higher interest rates to attract gold back.
This constraint made the gold standard incompatible with total war. Industrial-scale warfare required spending multiples of peacetime government revenue — spending that no combination of taxation and bond sales could fully cover. Suspending gold convertibility was not a choice; it was a prerequisite. A government fighting a modern war while maintaining gold convertibility would simply run out of gold within months.
The Economist magazine had argued before the war that a European conflict was impossible precisely because financial interdependence would destroy any belligerent's economy within weeks. This was spectacularly wrong: the suspension of gold convertibility liberated governments from the financial constraint the Economist had assumed would be binding.